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Introduction
Governments can engage in "creative accounting" to hide borrowing and sugarcoat the budget balance. Milesi-Ferretti (2003, p. 390) suggests using "the difference between budget deficits and the change in public debt" to measure creative accounting. Stock-flow adjustments describe the difference between deficits and the change in debt. A positive stock-flow adjustment shows that public debt increased by more than the deficit would imply, whereas a negative stock-flow adjustment shows that public debt increased by less than the deficit would imply. Some components of stock-flow adjustments, such as time-of-recording effects and valuation effects, should cancel out over time. "Below-the-line" operations, such as transactions in financial assets, however, can result in large and persistent stock-flow adjustments. 1 For example, a positive stock-flow adjustment occurs when a government uses equity injections into public companies to shift public expenditures out of the budget to public companies that are excluded from the fiscal accounts. Analogously, a negative stock-flow adjustment will occur when a government privatizes a public company. I examine whether electoral motives influenced creative accounting as measured by stock-flow adjustments. Governments may hide deficits so as to sugarcoat the budget balance before elections. Governments also have incentives to support or bail out private and public companies before elections by providing equity injections. Governments may hesitate to engage in privatization before elections in an effort to maintain a stronger influence on the economy (see also Buti et al. 2007) . Substantial equity injections from governments to private or public companies are recorded in many pre-election or election years. For example, in 2007 Eurostat reclassified the 2005 equity injections by the Portuguese government into two public hospitals as capital transfers because Eurostat was not convinced that the government had acted as a private shareholder and doubted the profitability of the investment .
A similar case happened in 2002 when the Portuguese government provided equity injections to seven public enterprises (including Metro Lisboa). 2002 and were election years in Portugal (see also Alt et al. 2014) . In 2012 Eurostat reclassified the equity injections from the Irish government to the state owned banks Allied Irish Banks and Irish Life & Permanent from a transaction in financial assets to a capital transfer, ex-post increasing the deficit in 2011 (an election year) by 3.7 percentage points (Carswell 2012). 2 Using an unbalanced panel of 27 OECD countries over the period 1970-2011, I show that stock-flow adjustments increased before elections. Governments were particularly likely to engage in creative accounting before regular elections.
Definition of Stock-Flow Adjustments
The government's budget identity describes that the change in debt in period t equals the deficit in period t (see, e.g., Barro 1979; Bohn 2007) 
(1)
where : denotes debt at the beginning of period t, : denotes debt at the end of period t,
: denotes the deficit in period t, : denotes expenditures (including interest payments) in period t, and : denotes revenues in period t. The debt level in period t is thus equal to the initial debt level in period t-n plus the accumulated deficits: . If the stock-flow adjustment is positive, public debt increases by more than the budget deficit in period t would imply: (1) Transactions in financial assets: The deficit is defined as the government's net borrowing, that is, the difference between revenues and expenditures excluding financial transactions (net concept). When computing the debt level, government assets are not netted from the liabilities (gross concept). Transactions in financial assets can thus give rise to increasing or decreasing public debt but do not affect the deficit ("below the line" operations).
For example, if a government issues debt and stores the receipts as a bank deposit, gross debt increases but the transaction has no effect on the deficit. A positive stock flow-adjustment can result when a government buys financial assets (e.g., equity injections into public or private companies); a negative stock-flow adjustment can result when a government sells financial assets (e.g., privatizations of public companies).
(2) Transactions in liabilities: Certain types of liabilities are recorded as stock-flow adjustments because they are excluded from the Eurostat government debt definition, such as liabilities in financial derivatives. The net incurrence of these types of liabilities enters 4 Time-of-recording effects can also give rise to stock-flow adjustments. Expenditures and revenues are recorded at the time the underlying transaction takes place even if the effective cash flow has not yet occurred (accrual accounting). Changes in debt are recorded when the effective cash payments or receipts occur (cash concept). If expenditures or revenues are recorded but the effective cash flow has not yet occurred, the deficit deviates from the change in debt. For example, positive stock-flow adjustments can result from the issuance of zero-coupon bonds or the reimbursement of taxes. Negative stock-flow adjustments can result from interest accrued from zero-coupon bonds or the collection of excessive taxes that will have to be reimbursed later.
negatively in the stock-flow adjustment, since they are only recorded in the deficit but not in the debt level.
(3) Valuation effects: Valuation effects describe changes in the value of debt resulting from changes in the level and structure of prices or the exchange rate. A revaluation of debt denominated in a foreign currency changes the face value of the debt without having an impact on the budget deficit. Exchange rate depreciations can lead to positive stock-flow adjustments; exchange rate appreciations can lead to negative stock-flow adjustments.
(4) Volume effects: Volume effects result from changes in sector classifications and other volume changes in financial liabilities that arise from the reclassification of units inside or outside general government and other cases of debt reductions that are not recorded in the deficit (e.g., debt redemptions).
Stock-flow adjustments can thus be expressed as: 5
where denotes transactions in financial assets, denotes transactions in liabilities, ∑ ∆ denotes valuation effects, ∑ ∆ denotes volume effects, ε t denotes statistical discrepancies, and j denotes the different types of financial assets and liabilities. 6 Stock-flow adjustments are prevalent in public finance statistics because of accounting issues. Stock-flow adjustments should, however, not generate a systemic bias between the stock of debt and the sum of all deficits over time. "Large and persistent stock-flow adjustments (especially if they always have a negative impact on debt developments) should 5 Seiferling (2013) describes stock-flow adjustments measured as the difference between the deficit and the change in debt as a partial stock-flow adjustment and computes a total stock-flow adjustment taking the difference between total flows (budget deficit, transactions in financial assets, transactions in liabilities, valuation effects and volume effects) and changes in debt. For the purpose of my analysis I rely on the definition of (partial) stock-flow adjustments as expressed in Equations (4) and (5) because I examine whether governments use the four main components of stock-flow adjustments to sugarcoat the budget balance rather than looking at statistical discrepancies. 6 Currency and deposits (j=1), securities other than shares excluding financial derivatives (j=2), loans (j=3), shares and other equity including financial derivatives (j=4), insurance technical reserves (j=5), other accounts receivable/payable (j=6) and monetary gold and special drawing rights (j=7).
give cause for concern, as they may be the result of the inappropriate recording of budgetary operations and can lead to large ex-post upward revisions of deficit levels" (European 
Prior Studies and Research Framework
Governments can manipulate financial data to sugarcoat the budget balance, an issue that is well known and has been described as "creative accounting" (Milesi Feretti 2003), "accounting fudges" (Dafflon and Rossi 1999) , "fiscal adjustment illusion" , "fiscal gimmickry" (Koen and van den Nord 2005) , and "cooking the books" (Laughland and Paul 1997) . Milesi-Ferretti (2003) suggests using stock-flow adjustments, defined as the difference between the budget deficit and the change in public debt, to measure creative accounting. Von Hagen and Wolff (2006, p. 3270) arrive at the conclusion that governments "systematically use stock-flow adjustments to lower deficits." European governments particularly engaged in creative accounting to hide borrowing after the introduction of the Stability and Growth Path (SGP) in 1998 (see, e.g., von , Beetsma et al. 2009 . The SGP limits the debt-to-GDP ratio to 60% and the deficit to 3%, but the deficit limit receives more attention. Governments thus had an incentive to embellish the deficit figures via creative accounting.
Experts examine which determinants influence stock-flow adjustments. Stock-flow adjustments have been large during financial crises (Weber 2012 , Seiferling 2013 . To support and bail out troubled financial institutions, governments purchased assets, provided loans and equity to financial institutions and engaged in other off-balance sheet activities that increased public debt but did not show up in the budget deficit. Currency devaluations that increased stock-flow adjustments particularly occurred in emerging countries (Weber 2012) .
Inflation increased stock-flow adjustments (Campos et al. 2006 , Weber 2012 , Seiferling 2013 ). Stock-flow adjustments were higher during economic downturns .
Greater transparency of the budgeting process, defined as the insight of the public into government structures and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts and projections, reduce the incentives for creative accounting. 7 Governments with a low fiscal transparency tend to invest more in equities that produce low returns (Seiferling and Tareq 2015) . Greater fiscal transparency should also increase the quality of fiscal data and thus decrease stock-flow adjustments resulting from measurement issues .
Political business cycle theories describe how politicians opportunistically manipulate fiscal policy before elections, assuming adaptive (Nordhaus 1975) or rational expectations (Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990 ) of the economic actors. 8 In the approaches assuming adaptive expectations, opportunistic politicians can fool naive voters and stimulate the economy immediately before each election. In the approaches assuming rational expectations, the incumbent government exploits its information advantage over the voters to signal 7 On fiscal transparency see Lassen (2006a, 2006b) and Lassen (2010). 8 On empirical evidence on political business cycles see, e.g., Alt et al. (2006a) , de Haan and Klomp (2013), de Haan and Sturm (1994) , Klomp and de Haan (2013) , Mechtel and Potrafke (2013), Mink and de Haan (2006) , Potrafke (2010a Potrafke ( , 2012 , Shi and Svensson (2006) , Wehner (2013) . economic competence before elections. Shi and Svensson (2006) show that politicians may behave opportunistically even if most voters know the government's policy, but some voters are uninformed. Empirical studies suggest that the incumbent government benefits from favorable economic conditions (see, for example, Hibbs 2006 for a literature survey). 9
Following the theories of opportunistic political budget cycles I expect stock-flow adjustments to increase before elections. To signal economic competence before elections, the incumbent governments can engage in creative accounting measures to hide deficits so as to sugarcoat the budget balance ("window dressing"). Governments also have incentives to support or bail out private and public companies before elections by providing equity injections and loans. Governments may hesitate to engage in privatization before elections in an effort to maintain a stronger influence on the economy. Two previous studies test for Elections may not be exogenous to fiscal policy because (unobserved) variables, such as crises or social unrest, can influence the timing of elections and fiscal policy (see Shi and Svensson 2006) . For example, during the financial crisis that began in 2007, early elections were called in Greece, Portugal, and Italy, while bank bailouts gave rise to large stock-flow 9 On a theoretical model where the probability of winning an election depends on economic performance see Aizenman and Powell (1998). adjustments. I thus distinguish between regular and early elections. The timing of regular elections is predetermined by the constitution and should be independent of fiscal policy.
Third, I provide an overview of government interventions that gave rise to large stock-flow adjustments. My paper is one of the first to examine stock-flow adjustments during the financial crisis that started in 2007, a period during which stock-flow adjustments were particularly large.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use data on 27 OECD countries over the period 1970-2011. I use data on revenues, expenditures, debt, and GDP from the AMECO database of the European Commission, which is based on Eurostat data. 10 The data apply to consolidated general government (central, state, and local governments, and the social security system). Using data from the AMECO database ensures a high level of comparability in terms of data definition and institutional coverage. Table 1 compares the 2011 debt level of the individual OECD countries in my sample with the accumulated deficits as described in Equation (3), that is, the sum of the debt level in the initial year and all budget deficits between the initial year and 2011 as a share of 2011 GDP (in percent). Stock-flow adjustments are persistent and the difference between the stock of debt and the accumulated deficits is large for many countries. For example, in Japan, the stock of debt as a share of GDP is about 113 percentage points higher than the budget data would suggest. When calculating the budget balance of the general government, the Japanese System of National Accounts (SNA) includes surpluses in the social security funds, even though these surpluses can be viewed as a debt owed to future beneficiaries, and excludes the financial balances of public corporations (Wright 1999) . "The exclusion of the substantial surpluses on the social security fund, and the inclusion of public corporations' deficits therefore has a marked effect on the financial balance of General Government so defined. The resulting fiscal deficit is therefore much larger and more persistent than that of General Government measured according to the conventions of SNA" (Wright 1999, p. 352 Voters may well consider the pre-election year budget deficit when deciding on whom to vote for because data for the election year may not yet be available, especially if elections take place early in the year. I consider parliamentary elections for countries with parliamentary political systems and presidential elections for countries with presidential systems. The average stock-flow adjustment to GDP ratio in pre-election years was 1.62%, the average stock-flow adjustment to GDP ratio in election years was 1.72%, and the average stock-flow adjustment to GDP ratio in the other years was 0.91%.
I have decomposed stock-flow adjustments in its single components. Data for the single components are, however, not available for all countries in my sample and only for years after 1994. Transactions in financial assets account for about 98% and adjustments 11 The Japanese public pension fund also accumulated financial assets to a large extent (Abbas et al. 2014 ).
(transactions in liabilities, valuation effects, and volume effects) account for about 2% of average stock-flow adjustments (see Table A2 in the appendix). Transactions in financial assets can be decomposed in currency and deposits (35%), securities other than shares (20%), loans (12%), shares and other equity (15%), and other financial assets (19%). Figure 2 shows the development of average acquisitions of financial assets, average adjustments, and average statistical discrepancies over the period 1995-2011. Average adjustments and statistical discrepancies were relatively stationary over time. 12 Transactions in financial assets strongly increased over the period 1997-2008.
Stock-flow adjustments were particularly large during the financial crisis that started in 2007. In many countries, stock-fow adjustments reflect the acquisition of financial assets during the financial crisis. Figure 3 and FMS-Wertmanagement) and their loans (see also . 12 The increase in adjustments in 2001 was caused by a large appreciation of debt denominated in foreign currency in Turkey, the increase in adjustments in 2008 was caused by 13 To calculate the net acquisition of financial assets, I use the annual change in the difference between gross and net debt because government assets are netted from gross debt to calculate net debt (see Weber 2012) . I use data on gross and net debt from the IMF World Economic Outlook.
Empirical Analysis

Empirical Specification
The baseline panel data model has the following form:
where the dependent variable The variable Early election in next year ti assumes the value 1 if an early election takes place in country i in year t+1 and 0 otherwise. I expect governments to strategically use stock-flow adjustments before regular elections but not before early elections because governments may not have enough time to strategically react to early elections.
The vector X includes index and dummy control variables. I examine whether political ideology influences stock-flow adjustments. Left-wing governments may try to gain more influence over the economy, for example, by acquiring company shares. Right-wing governments may be more likely to engage in privatization and deregulation (see, e.g., Bortolotti et al. 2003; Bortolotti and Pinotti 2008; Belloc et al. 2014; Potrafke 2010b ). The index Left takes values between 1 and 5. The index assumes the value 1 if the share of the governing right-wing parties in terms of seats in the cabinet and in parliament is larger than two-thirds, and 2 if it is between one-third and two-thirds. The index assumes the value 3 if the share of center parties is 50%, or if the left-wing and right-wing parties form a coalition government. The index is symmetric and assumes the value 4 if the share of the governing left-wing parties in terms of seats in the cabinet and in parliament is larger than two-thirds, and 5 if it is between one-third and two-thirds (see Potrafke 2009 Potrafke , 2011 Brech and Potrafke 2014) .
To control for political constraints on the executive power which can moderate politically-driven fiscal policy manipulations I include the POLCONIII Index (Henisz 2002 15 On political business cycle and partisan effects in monetary policy, see, e.g., Dreher and Vaubel (2009) and Belke and Potrafke (2012) . 16 Eurostat data on stock-flow adjustments caused by valuation effects are available for only 23 of the countries in my sample and only for years after 1995. Average stock-flow adjustments caused by valuation effects were particularly large in Hungary (0.95%) and Iceland (1.09%). Most other countries did not experience large currency revaluations.
I estimate the baseline model by using OLS with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity (Huber/White/sandwich standard errors; see Huber 1967; White 1980 White , 1982 Stock and Watson 2008) . Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all variables. Table 3 shows the regression results for the baseline panel data model. In Columns (1) and (2) I use the Election and Election in next year variables as the main explanatory variables. In column (1) I only include fixed state and fixed period effects and in Column (2) I add control variables. In columns (3) and (4) The coefficient of the variable Election has a positive sign but does not turn out to be statistically significant at conventional levels in columns (1) and (2). The coefficient of the variable election in next year has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1) and (2). The results suggest that stock-flow adjustments increased by about 2 percentage points in years before elections. The coefficient of the variable Regular election has a positive sign but does not turn out to be statistically significant in columns (3) to (5) .
Results
The coefficient of the variable Regular election in next year has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level in column (3), at the 1% level in column (4) , and at the 10% level in column (5) . Stock-flow adjustments increased by about 2-2.5 percentage points in years before regular elections. The coefficient of the variable Early election has a positive sign but does not turn out to be statistically significant in columns (3)- (5) . The coefficient of the variable Early election in next year has a positive sign but does not turn out to be statistically significant at conventional levels in columns (3) and (4). In column (5) the coefficient of the Early election in next year variable has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level.
The coefficient of the Left variable has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (2) and (4). The results suggest that stock-ow adjustments were lower under left-wing governments. The coefficient of the Political constraints variable has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level in Column (2) and (4). The results suggest that political constraints mitigate increases in stock-flow adjustments. The coefficient of the Banking crisis dummy does not turn out to be statistically significant. The effect of banking crises may well be absorbed by the fixed time effects because banking crisis often occur at the same time in several countries. The coefficient of the Debt rule variable has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant in column (5) . The coefficient of the variable Inflation has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in Columns
(2) and (4). The coefficients of the variables Balanced budget rule, Output gap, and Valuation effect do not turn out to be statistically significant.
Alternative Specifications and Robustness Tests
Following Alt et al. (2014) , I count the years until the next to test for political business cycles.
The panel data model has the following form:
where the variable Years left in current term it assumes the value 0 if an election takes place in country i in year t and the value n-k, k ϵ [1,n] , in year k after an election year, where n denotes the length of the term. In countries where early elections can be called, the variable is set to the de jure term limit or schedule of elections and resets to 0 when an early election is called (Beck et al. 2001; Keefer 2012) . (1) and (2). The results are in line with Alt et al. (2014) : stock-flow adjustments increased at the end of the term. In Column (3) the coefficient of the Years left in current term variable does not turn out to be significant at conventional levels.
Creative accounting measures as a way of "window dressing" before elections requires that governments believe that voters care about and dislike deficits. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, voters in most countries were less concerned about deficits than in the 1990s and 2000s. Government debt was much lower and Keynesian thinking was very popular.
Governments thus may have found it politically attractive to show deficits to signal their economic policy competence. I split the sample into a pre-and post-1992 period. In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was signed and deficits were officially disapproved at least in Europe. Table 5 shows the regression results. Using the pre-1992 period the coefficients of the Governments may well a combination of several components of stock-flow adjustments rather than an individual component to hide deficits before elections.
I also tested whether financial crises other than banking crises influenced stock-flow adjustments. Rogoff (2009, 2011) Note: OLS with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity (Huber/White/sandwich standard errors) in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Unbalanced panel for 27 OECD countries covering the period 1970-2011. 
